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The paper analyzes the potential impact of the EU’s European Neighborhood Policy on democracy and human rights in the partner countries. On the one hand, the political conditionality advocated in the ENP documents is consistent with the general approach the EU has taken toward the institutionalization of its relations with nonmember countries. A data-based analysis of the political impact of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the Eastern European ENP countries and of the Barcelona Process shows, however, that political conditionality has been neither consistent nor effective and there are no reasons to believe that this will change under ENP. I argue that this is not primarily due to the inconsistency of political conditionality but to the combination of weak external incentives and high domestic adaptation costs. A case study of Belarus illustrates this conjecture.
Introduction

In the Commission’s ENP Strategy Paper (May 2004), “democracy and good governance” appears in two ways. First, together with stability, it is one of the overarching goals of the entire policy and a condition for cooperation in other areas. Second, it is a specific issue-area of cooperation alongside others. Since a stringent political conditionality might prevent functional cooperation in other issue-areas, or the quest for efficient cooperation in those other issue-areas might compromise political conditionality, there is a potential source of goal conflict and inconsistency within ENP. Does the EU generally privilege its value commitments in its external relations, and does it treat all partner countries according to the same standards? The most relevant question, however, is that of effectiveness. Can we expect the ENP to have a positive impact on democracy and human rights in the partner countries? The paper will address both questions.
The inclusion of democracy and human rights is neither new nor specific to ENP. Political conditionality has become a general feature of EU external relations in the course of the 1990s and all ENP partner countries have been subject to political conditionality in one form or another in their previous institutional arrangements with the EU. Thus, endogenous institutional and identity-based factors primarily account for the origins of this policy domain in the ENP. They are no guarantee of effective impact, however.
Research on the use and effectiveness of political conditionality in the accession process strongly suggests that the EU predominantly relied on the attractiveness of membership to achieve progress in democracy and human rights – and that a credible membership perspective has been a necessary condition for an effective impact on domestic change. It has not been sufficient, however. Even when a membership perspective was credible, high domestic political power costs of adaptation to EU conditions have blocked compliance. Since ENP countries are without a membership perspective and generally governed by authoritarian regimes for whom the political power costs of complying with democratic and human rights rules are high, these findings strongly suggest that ENP will not have a significant impact on democracy and human rights in the ENP countries.
To address the questions about goal conflict, consistency, and effectiveness empirically, the paper will draw on general human rights data as well as an illustrative case study. Since policy instruments similar to ENP have been in place for at least ten years in EU relations with Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, data such as the Freedom House ratings give us a rather good general picture regarding the correlation between EU political conditionality and democratic or human rights improvements in the ENP countries. The case study deals with Belarus.
The analysis shows that EU political conditionality vis-à-vis the ENP countries has been neither consistent nor effective in the past. The lack of consistency suggests that political conditionality has indeed suffered from conflicting functional goals of improving and institutionalizing relations with the neighboring countries. The lack of effectiveness confirms the relevance of the incentive and cost factors identified in previous studies. As long as membership incentives are absent and the ENP countries are governed by authoritarian regimes, there is no reason to expect that ENP will have a more positive impact on democracy and human rights in the partner countries in the future.


Democracy and Good Governance in the EU’s European Neighborhood Policy

With regard to the issues of democracy and good governance, the ENP does not constitute a break with previous EU policies toward nonmember countries. First, the ENP is based on the EU’s commitment to promoting core liberal values and norms beyond its borders. Second, the EU uses political conditionality as the main instrument of norm promotion. Finally, direct democracy assistance complements political conditionality as a secondary instrument.
In its ENP Strategy Paper, the Commission invokes the EU’s general value commitments: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. These values are common to the Member States ... In its relations with the wider world, [the Union] aims at upholding and promoting these values.” In addition, the Commission calls attention to the fact that “the Union’s neighbours have pledged adherence to fundamental human rights and freedoms, through their adherence to a number of multilateral treaties as well as through their bilateral agreements with the EU.” These mutual commitments form the basis for the dual role of democracy and human rights in ENP, first, as a pre-condition for participation in ENP and, second, as an objective of ENP actions (Commission 2004).
On the one hand, the ENP offers a “privileged partnership with neighbours”, which “will build on mutual commitment to common values principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development.” Under the ENP umbrella, the EU draws up and negotiates Action Plans for each partner country. Given the various regional contexts and the highly different political and economic situations of the partner countries, the EU’s and the partners’ priorities and interests will vary strongly, and so will the content and the objectives of the individual Action Plans. In addition, however, the Strategy Paper stipulates that differentiation should “be based on a clear commitment to shared values” and that the “level of ambition of the EU’s relationships with its neighbours will take into account the extent to which these values are effectively shared.” What is more, the Strategy Paper outlines a clear political conditionality for the participation of neighboring countries in the ENP that are not yet considered worthy. For instance, with regard to countries of the Southern Caucasus, the Commission proposes that the “EU should consider the possibility of developing Action Plans ... in the future on the basis of their individual merits. With this in view, the Commission will report to the Council on progress made by each country with respect to the strengthening of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights.” With regard to Belarus, it promises to “reinforce its lasting commitments to supporting democratic development ... When fundamental political and economic reforms take place, it will be possible for Belarus to make full use of the ENP.”
On the other hand, the Strategy Paper outlines “a number of priorities” for the individual Action Plans “intended to strengthen commitment to these values. These include strengthening democracy and the rule of law, the reform of the judiciary and the fight against corruption and organised crime; respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, trade union rights and other core labour standards, and fight against the practice of torture and prevention of ill-treatment; support for the development of civil society; and co-operation with the Criminal Court.”
Thus, the ENP contains all the elements of previous EU policies toward nonmembers. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the EU (then EC) has made assistance and institutional ties – first informally and later formally – conditional on the fulfillment of democratic and human rights standards (see Smith 2001: 37-40). Generally, these conditions become more stringent as external countries seek to upgrade their institutional ties with and assistance by the Union. 
Already in January 1989, the European Parliament demanded that “reference to human rights should figure” in the Trade and Cooperation Agreements the EC was beginning to negotiate with the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) and should be mentioned specifically in the negotiating mandates given to the Commission (Agence Europe, 20 January 1989). In April, the Council made resumption of the negotiations with Romania conditional upon this country’s compliance with its human rights commitments in the CSCE framework (Agence Europe, 24-25 April 1989). In November, the Paris summit established that “initiatives aimed at the countries of Eastern Europe as a whole are applicable only to those which re-establish freedom and democracy.” (Agence Europe, 22 November 1989) 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Commission confirmed that “negotiating (…) new types of agreements has to be subject to political conditions (respect of human rights and democratic freedoms, guarantees for minorities, etc.).” (Agence Europe, 27 February 1992). In May 1992, the Council underscored that respect for democratic principles and human rights (…), as well as the principles of a market economy, constitute essential elements of cooperation and association agreements between the Community and its CSCE partners” (Agence Europe, 14 May 1992). Henceforth, the EU added a clause to the agreements which stipulated a suspension of the agreements if partner countries fail to comply with these principles. In November of the same year, the Council approved guidelines for the EC’s main program of assistance to the CEECs (PHARE) which made aid conditional upon the “state of advance of the reforms in each of the beneficiary countries.” (Agence Europe, 16-17 November 1992) On this basis, Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro have long been denied PHARE aid. In July 1993, the new regulations of the aid program for the former Soviet republics (TACIS) strengthened conditionality, too: “The level and intensity of the assistance will take into account the extent and progress of reform efforts in the beneficiary country.” (Agence Europe, 24 July 1993)
Finally, at its Copenhagen summit in June 1993, the European Council established the “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” as the sine qua non political condition of accession to the EU. In its 1997 Opinions on the applications and in its subsequent annual progress reports, the Commission has regularly evaluated the political conditions in all candidate countries. In 1997, its negative assessment temporarily deleted Slovakia from the list of first-wave candidates; and since 1999, Turkey’s failure to fulfill the political criteria has been the most serious obstacle to the opening of accession negotiations with this country.
In their Barcelona Declaration, the EU and its Mediterranean Partners also declared to “develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems” and to “respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and guarantee the effective legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms”.​[1]​ “Respect for human rights and democratic principles are an essential element of the [Euro-Mediterranean Association] Agreements and the architecture of each Agreement is such as to enable it to be suspended in the event of major human rights violations.”​[2]​
Thus, it may be argued that endogenous institutional and identity-based factors primarily account for the origins of this policy domain in the ENP. First, the affirmation of democracy and human rights as essential components of ENP and the political conditionality of ENP follow from the EU’s identity as an international community of liberal democratic states. It is most clearly stated in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union: “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.” For the last 15 years, the EU has made the promotion of democracy and human rights a cornerstone of its relations with external countries and has made the intensification of these relations dependent upon respect for the values by its partners – at least at a declaratory level.
Second, Judith Kelley (2005) points to institutional factors that explain the high degree of policy continuity. Many of the Commission officials responsible for designing and implementing ENP have previously worked on enlargement and relations with the CEECs. What is more, the Commission appears to regard ENP as an opportunity to maintain and expand those foreign policy competencies that it gained and used in the course of Eastern enlargement. 
The practical and effective implementation of a value-based policy of conditionality cannot be taken for granted, however. First, since a stringent political conditionality might prevent useful functional cooperation in other issue-areas, or the quest for efficient cooperation in those other issue-areas might compromise political conditionality, there is a potential source of goal conflict and inconsistency within ENP, and it is an open question whether such a conflict will be generally resolved in favor of the EU’s value commitments. It is a second open question under which conditions even a consistent strategy of democracy promotion by political conditionality will be effective. 

Theoretical expectations
Previous studies by the author and others come to broadly similar results on the question of effectiveness.​[3]​ They corroborate the “external incentives” model of the domestic impact of European organizations (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005), a bargaining model which emphasizes the cost-benefit balance of the target states as the main condition of compliance. In turn, this cost-benefit balance depends on the determinacy of IO conditions, the size and speed of rewards, the credibility of threats and promises, and the size of adoption costs. In the relations between the EU and its candidates for membership, credible EU membership incentives and low domestic adaptation costs are individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of compliance (Schimmelfennig 2005a).  In other words, EU influence on compliance with human rights and democratic rules in the candidate countries has generally not been effective before the EU had developed a clear membership promise for the Central and Eastern European countries and if it did not make compliance an explicit condition of accession (or the beginning of accession negotiations). 
However, even when accession conditionality was credible, it did not automatically result in candidate compliance. The liberal democratic norms, which are the subject of political conditionality, usually limit the autonomy and power of governments. They prohibit certain undemocratic and illiberal practices on which a government may rely to preserve its power – such as suppressing opposition parties or civic associations, curbing the freedom of the press, or rigging elections. Moreover, they may change power relations between governmental actors – such as increasing the independence of courts or limiting the political influence of the military. Finally, above all in the case of minority rights, they affect the composition of the citizenship and empower certain social and ethnic groups. This may erode the social power base of governments and, in their opinion, threaten the security, integrity, and identity of the state. Whenever compliance with EU conditions would lead to de facto regime change and risk the incumbent government’s loss of power, target governments failed to comply. They value the preservation of their political power higher than EU membership.
As Vachudova (2001; 2005) argues, however, EU incentives may still have been a sufficient condition for successful democratic consolidation, by producing electoral change through domestic empowerment. Even if EU incentives failed to affect authoritarian governments directly, (the threat of) exclusion by the EU signaled to the societies in authoritarian states that the incumbent government was the main obstacle to their country’s EU accession. These signals undermined the European credentials of authoritarian governments, mobilized the electorate against them, and induced an often weak and fragmented democratic opposition to join forces. As a result, authoritarian governments in Romania (1997), Slovakia (1998), and Croatia (2000) were defeated and new, reform-oriented governments put the countries (back) on the track to membership.
Other authors contest any systematic and sustained influence of EU democratic conditionality on electoral choices (see e.g. Krause 2003 for Slovakia). Actual voting behavior is more strongly shaped by immediate concerns with personal security and welfare than by concerns about the government’s conformance with western norms. Most often, changes in government have been caused by societal dissatisfaction with the hardships of economic shock therapy, economic mismanagement by the incumbent government, and corruption scandals, and this dissatisfaction has turned against reform-friendly and reform-adverse governments alike (Jasiewicz 1998: 186; Pravda 2001: 26-27). The ascendance of centrist political forces in the Romanian and Bulgarian elections of 1996/97, the Slovak elections of 1998, and the Croatian and Serbian elections of 2000 certainly strengthened the reform orientation of these countries but it was predominantly the economic situation that brought about the change. As the subsequent election outcomes (2000/01 in Bulgaria and Romania and 2003/04 in Croatia and Serbia) show, voters may again shift their allegiance away from the most western-oriented political forces if these fail to provide for effective governance and an improvement of the economic situation.
According to the alternative explanation (Schimmelfennig 2005b), elections in Central and Eastern Europe are best understood as events that (sometimes) create the opportunity for conditionality to work effectively rather than as an effect of conditionality itself. After such electoral openings, conditionality worked through lock-in effects. When liberal-democratic parties were in government temporarily, the domestic reforms they institutionalized and the progress they made in western integration raised the stakes in democratic consolidation and increase the costs of any future reversal. Authoritarian parties therefore adapted their political goals in order to preserve the achieved benefits of integration. After the major nationalist-authoritarian parties of Croatia (HDZ), Romania (PDSR) and Slovakia (HZDS) had been voted out of government, Romania and Slovakia started accession negotiations with the EU, and Croatia became an EU associate and applied for membership. During the same time, these parties modified their programs and presented themselves as unequivocally pro-integration. When the PDSR and the HDZ were elected back to power in 2000 and 2003, they stayed the course of reform and integration. 
What follows from these findings for EU relations with non-candidate neighboring countries? In general, both the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of effective EU impact are absent. First, the absence of a membership perspective strongly reduces the external incentives of compliance. Second, almost all of the non-candidate neighboring countries are authoritarian or autocratic states. Thus, on the basis of the external incentives model and of the empirical results of studies on the candidate countries, the expectation is that EU political conditionality in the context of ENP will not be effective.
Will it be consistent at least? Again, previous findings and theoretical considerations point toward negative expectations. First, studies of EU democracy promotion beyond candidates for membership generally come to the conclusion that EU policy has been inconsistent, fragmented and often undermined by strategic or economic goals. At the end of his study of EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean, Richard Youngs asserts that the “rhetoric ... that developed around the principle of co-operation on political reform was matched by concrete policy instruments only to a limited extent” and that “European governments failed full to follow through their own holistic logic to secure influence over reforms to political society institutions. Issues of democratization were not factored into trade calculations in any systematic way.” (Youngs 2001: 90-91). Second, it can be assumed theoretically that identity-based values and norms become the more politically relevant in relations with external countries the closer these countries move toward membership. Membership in the EU is a constitutive or constitutional issue and, as such, more likely to be affected by questions of identity and fundamental values than issues of functional cooperation, regulation and distribution (Schimmelfennig 2003). Conversely, in its relations with countries that are not considered potential future members, the EU is less normatively constrained and can treat democracy and human rights more expediently. As a result, consistency will be low.
 
EU Association and Human Rights in the ENP Countries

How consistent and effective have EU political conditionality and institutional association been in the past with regard to the ENP target countries? To address this question, I use the Freedom Index (FI), the summary rating provided annually by Freedom House for civil liberties and political rights.​[4]​ According to Diamond (1996: 24), Freedom House ratings are “the best available empirical indicator[s] of ‘liberal democracy.’” Table 1 presents the relevant data for the ENP countries.
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Table 1 presents data for all potential ENP countries. In Eastern Europe, these countries include the EU neighbors Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine plus the Caucasus countries Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, which the General Affairs and External Relations Council decided to include in the ENP in June 2004. In the Mediterranean region, I included all nonmember countries that participated in the Barcelona process plus Libya as a potential future participant. The Balkan countries and Turkey, which are recognized as candidate countries for full EU membership, are excluded from the analysis. Note that Freedom House data are not readily available for the Palestinian Authority (PA), which is not a sovereign state. Table 1 only includes ratings for the PA for 2004.
To assess the conditions and effects of EU association of the ENP countries, I begin the analysis with starting dates of negotiations for the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) with the Eastern European countries and the Barcelona Process (column 2). For the Eastern European countries, PCA have been the highest form of contractual relations with the EU, and the first negotiations began at the end of 1992 (with Russia). In the Mediterranean region, the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona in November 1995 marked the starting point for negotiating Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAA), the rough equivalent to the PCA in the East. The Freedom Index for 1992 and 1995 (FI1) respectively serves as a benchmark for evaluating the effects of association on democratization in the ENP countries.
Column 3 lists the years in which the EU signed a PCA or EMAA with the ENP country; column 4 reports the Freedom Index for this year (FI 2). D1 in column 5 calculates the difference in FI ratings between FI1 and FI2. It is a measure of the improvement (positive values) or deterioration (negative values) that has occurred between the start of the association process and the signing of the agreements. Whereas the FI2 values in column 4 help us to learn something about the thresholds and the consistency of  EU political conditionality, the D1 values are indicators of effectiveness. Columns 6 to 8 do the same for the period between the signing of the agreements and their entry into force.
Column 9 present the most recent Freedom House data for 2004. They serve to calculate the difference D3 in column 10 between the current state of political rights and civil liberties (FI4) and the state of liberal democracy when the agreements went into force (FI3) and thus to measure the effect of  EU agreements after conditionality ceased to play a role. Finally, column 11 lists the difference in FI ratings for the entire period from the start of the PCA and Barcelona processes until 2004. 
Which inferences can we draw from these data? First, the starting points for the ENP countries have been very different. With a rating of 2 (and thus qualifying as a “free country” according to Freedom House), Israel is the positive outlier; Libya and Syria are the negative extremes with ratings of 7 (“not free”). Half of the countries fall into the “partly free” category ranging from 3 to 5. The average ENP country had a rating of 4.75 at the beginning of the process, representing the lower end of the “partly free” category. The standard deviation of Freedom House ratings for the ENP countries was 1.42. Briefly put, democracy was generally weak to absent in the ENP countries; there was vast room for improvement triggered by EU association policies.
If EU political conditionality was consistent and effective, we would expect to see both better and less varying FI ratings for those countries that signed PCAs and EMAAs. However, the average FI2 ratings are only slightly better than the average FI1 ratings (4.7 as compared to 4.75). The changes in ratings (D1) show that most of the states that have signed an agreement with the EU to this date experienced no change at all between the start of the association process and the signing of the agreement. The situation improved in three countries but it actually worsened in four of them. On average, the change is slightly negative (-0.1). The standard deviation improved (from 1.43 to 1.24) but, just as at beginning of the process, FI ratings varied from 2 to 7 for the ENP countries that signed an agreement. That is, with the exception of Libya, the EU did not implement any noticeable and consistent political conditionality ahead of signing agreements with its neighboring non-candidate countries. The only discernible pattern appears to be that the most autocratic systems tend to sign association agreements later (Syria in 2004, Algeria and Lebanon in 2002, and Egypt in 2001 – but see Tunisia 1995). What is more, the first stage of the association process has had no positive, democracy-promoting impact in these countries.
The second phase to be analyzed lasts from the signing of agreements to their entry into force. Due to the fact that agreements for some of the most autocratic states have not (yet) entered into force (Belarus, Algeria, Syria), the average FI rating improves to 4.29 and the worst rating in the group changes from 7 to 5.5. Thus, we see a small effect of a slightly more discriminatory conditionality policy of the EU. We also see a small positive effect on the political situation in those countries whose agreements with the EU have entered into force. Five countries experienced an improvement in FI ratings between signing and entry into force and only one country (Jordan) suffered from a deterioration of the rating resulting in a small average improvement of 0.13. However, these are only interim results that should not be overinterpreted. If the EMAAs with Algeria and Syria enter into force in the absence of a marked improvement of the political situation in these two countries, the minor positive effects will probably disappear altogether.
What is more, the small improvements in those countries with agreements in force have not lasted. Five out of 12 associated countries (all in Eastern Europe) experienced a net deterioration of the political situation after the PCAs entered into force. In 2004, the average FI rating for the associated countries (FI4) dropped to 4.5 (from 4.29 upon entry into force). The average change (D3) was slightly negative (-0.2). That is, if there was any improvement due to political conditionality between signing and entry into force of the agreements, this improvement was more than compensated by negative developments in the aftermath of entry into force.
This finding is confirmed if one looks at the overall effectiveness of the impact of EU policy on the ENP countries in the last decade. The average FI rating for this group of countries in 2004 was 5 as compared to 4.75 at the beginning of the association process, and the average change (D) was slightly negative (-0.2) for the entire time period.
In sum, the EU has had no positive impact on the overall political and human rights situation in its neighboring non-candidate countries, and the are no theoretical or empirical reasons to assume that this will change under ENP. This result confirms the expectation derived in the previous section on the basis of the external incentives model and of earlier studies on the EU impact on candidate countries. 
The data, however, do not give any clear indication on the causes of this lack of impact. On the one hand, one could argue that the political conditionality failed because of its inconsistency. In the absence of a clear political discrimination between the potential partners, which would distinctively award the less autocratic neighboring countries in comparison with the more autocratic ones, conditionality is bound to be ineffective. On the other hand, however, it could be argued that political conditionality would have failed even if had been consistent because the potential benefits of compliance with EU conditions were so much smaller than the costs of adaptation. In the absence of a membership perspective, EU incentives could not match the political power costs the incumbent regimes would have incurred had they complied with EU democracy and human rights conditions. To substantiate this argument, the next section presents a case study of one country in which EU political conditionality was consistent and discriminatory but failed nevertheless: Belarus.


Belarus: a case study

Belarus has always been a laggard in the eastern European transformation process. The Communist leadership of the Belorussian Republic of the Soviet Union largely ignored the policies of glasnost and perestroika and backed the coup d’état against President Gorbachev in August 1991. When the coup d’état failed, the Communist Party was banned and the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet was replaced by Stanislau Shushkevich. Shushkevich was not a member of the Communist Party, an outsider to the Belarusian political establishment, and the de facto head of state after Belarus had become independent in December 1991. In contrast, the parliament (Supreme Soviet) elected in 1990, was not dissolved and remained a stronghold of the Communist establishment. The opposition, mainly represented by the Belarusian Popular Front, only had about 10 percent of the seats. Together with Prime Minister Vyachaslav Kebich, the parliamentary majority systematically undermined the cautious reform agenda and moderately nationalist policies of Shushkevich and, finally, managed to remove him from office on fabricated charges of corruption in early 1994. Nevertheless, the political system of Belarus also showed some signs of liberalization during this period. Media pluralism, a multi-party system and the separation of powers emerged during the first years of independence, and a democratic constitution came into force in 1994.
When, however, Alyaksandr Lukashenka was elected President in July 1994 under the new constitution, this process was reversed and Belarus began to develop into what is today the most autocratic regime in the whole of Europe (Korosteleva 2002; Marples 2002; Sahm 2001a). Lukashenka soon sought to concentrate all state powers in his hands. In 1995, he tried to obstruct the election of a new parliament. When he failed to do so, he manipulated a referendum in November 1996 in order to change the constitution in favor of himself. Firstly, he established a bicameral parliament instead of the single-chamber Supreme Soviet. He hand-picked the members of the new lower house from the loyal members of the Supreme Soviet without an election. The deputies of the upper house were to be chosen by the President (and the local councils), too. The disregarded opposition deputies of the elected parliament reacted by establishing a rump parliament, which they claimed to be the only legitimate legislative body. Secondly, Lukashenka obtained the right to dissolve the parliament and to rule by decree without parliamentary approval. Thirdly, under the new constitution, Lukashenka was able to select the majority of the judges of the constitutional court, another institutional source of opposition. Finally, Lukashenka extended his period of office without elections until 2001. In addition to these constitutional changes, Lukashenka strengthened his personal rule by controlling the recruitment and appointment of government officials at the center and in the regions. He established state control of the media: independent newspapers were shut down and forced to be printed abroad. Members of the opposition were arrested, prosecuted, and convicted arbitrarily; some have “disappeared”. Non-governmental organizations suffer from persistent administrative and financial harassment.
Obviously, the Lukashenka regime violated systematically the core liberal-democratic norms of the European international community. It undermined the democratic process, the separation of powers, and the rule of law and suppressed core civil liberties and political rights such as the freedom of expression and association. Parliamentary and presidential elections continued to take place regularly but were neither free nor fair.

International Demands and Conditions
In the early years of independence, the integration of Belarus into the European international community proceeded in lockstep with that of the other European successor countries of the Soviet Union. Belarus became a member of the OSCE. In September 1992, it received the status of a special guest of the Council of Europe and applied for membership in March 1993. Also in 1993, it began negotiations on a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the European Community. The PCA was signed in March 1995. Belarus joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in March 1992 and became a NATO partner in January 1995.
When Lukashenka started to put his dictatorial regime in place, the integration process began to stagnate. The EU, for instance, made the Interim Agreement to the PCA – which would have put into effect its trade-related provisions ahead of ratification – dependent on democratic and economic reform.​[5]​ After the parliamentary election of 1995, the Commission proposed to implement the agreement but the process was halted because of the deteriorating democratic and human rights situation in the course of 1996.​[6]​ On the eve of the 1996 referendum, all European organizations condemned Lukashenka’s plans to change the Belarusian constitution and warned him of negative consequences if he was to proceed with them (Timmermann 1997: 31-33). After the referendum, they refused to recognize the constitutional changes and the dissolution of the elected parliament. In the OSCE, Belarus was able to avoid a formal condemnation or even suspension of its membership thanks to the support of the Russian Federation. However, the members of the elected parliament continued to occupy the seats of Belarus in the OSCE’s Parliamentary Assembly.​[7]​ The Council of Europe, which had commissioned various legal opinions on the constitutional changes and sent a fact-finding mission to observe the referendum, suspended the special guest status of Belarus in January 1997. The EU stopped the ratification process for the PCA. In addition, negotiations on a TACIS program for the 1996-99 period were completely suspended.​[8]​ The member states of the European Union and the associated countries agreed to suspend all high-level intergovernmental contacts with Belarus. When Lukashenka’s original period of office expired in July 1999, both the EU and the U.S. stopped recognizing him as the “legitimate” President of Belarus.​[9]​ Belarus became a pariah state in the European international community.
The suspension of formal ties and official cooperation with the government of Belarus was the immediate reaction of most European organizations to the establishment of an autocratic regime in Belarus after 1996. In addition, they made the resumption of institutionalized cooperation conditional on credible steps towards liberalization and democratization in the country. For instance, the EU declared time and again that EU-Belarusian cooperation “cannot proceed in the absence of convincing efforts to re-establish” a political system “which respects the internationally accepted norms for human rights and political freedoms.”​[10]​ The so-called “step-by-step approach” has been the official policy of the EU towards Belarus since 1999. In particular, the European organizations demanded four steps as a precondition for ending the isolation of Belarus. The opposition had to be represented in the electoral commission, the government had to grant the opposition fair access to the state media; the electoral legislation had to conform to international standards, and substantial powers had to be returned to the parliament. Later, the CoE and the OSCE added, for instance, the release of political prisoners, the establishment of an ombudsman’s office, and the abolishment of the death penalty to the list of demands.​[11]​
The efforts of the European organizations, however, were not limited to intergovernmental social and material sanctions as well as political conditionality. International mediation and support to the political opposition and civil society of Belarus complemented this strategy (Wieck 2002). All European organizations considered it vital not to isolate Belarus entirely, to cultivate links with the opposition and civil society and to be present in the country. In the first half of 1997, the EU sent a team (including representatives of the CoE) to Belarus to mediate between the President and the excluded members of the elected parliament. In the following years, however, the EU abandoned its own mediation efforts. Instead, the “Parliamentary Troika”, composed of members of the European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE, has frequently visited Belarus on fact-finding and mediation missions and, most importantly, in fall 1997, the OSCE established an Advisory and Monitoring Group (AMG) in Minsk with a mandate “to assist … the Belarusian authorities in promoting democratic institutions and in complying with OSCE commitments and to monitor and report on this process” and to consult with the opposition and NGO sector.​[12]​ 
	Although the EU finally stopped all financial and technical assistance to the government of Belarus under the TACIS program, it approved a 5 million ECU “democratization and development programme for civil society in Belarus” in December 1997.​[13]​ The EU funded NGOs, independent media, and youth groups and promoted the development of European studies in, and partnerships with, Belarusian universities and other academic institutions. Another 5 million ECU were approved in 2000, but, in line with the general reluctance of the EU to support democratization directly and proactively, the amount remained far behind the earlier TACIS aid for Belarus (54 million ECU between 1991 and 1996) and was even considerably lower than the continuing TACIS aid for the no less dictatorial regimes of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Charman 2002: 390, 395-396). By comparison, U.S. support to NGOs and opposition groups in Belarus was reported to have amounted to approximately 50 million USD in the two election years of 2000 and 2001 together; in 2003, a “Belarus Democracy Act” sponsored by the House of Representatives called for 40 million USD.​[14]​
What are the international conditions under which the western organizations tried to promote democracy and human rights in Belarus? The punishments and rewards involved were mainly of a social kind. The suspension of institutional ties and the ban on high-level contacts is best understood as a shunning strategy designed to ostracize the Lukashenka regime. In addition, the European organizations regarded Belarus as a potential member of the European international community and held out the prospect of welcoming their “prodigal son” back to the family. They expressed their wish “to see Belarus take its place among democratic European countries”​[15]​, hoped “that Belarus will soon become a member of the democratic family”​[16]​, and “underlined their political interest in assisting Belarus to rejoin European democracies.” (Wieck 2000: 1) Moreover, the European organizations reminded the Lukashenka regime of its previous commitments, exposed the inconsistencies between words and deeds, and tried to put its international credibility at stake. For instance, the EU General Affairs Council publicly observed “a clear gap between the commitment made by the Belarus authorities in the light of the report by the EU observer mission and the situation in the country.”​[17]​ 
	Material incentives were only involved in the PCA with the EU. Indeed, Aad Kosto, head of the EU’s 1997 fact-finding mission assumed that the extremely bad economic situation of Belarus and its need for economic aid would “give us an instrument we will use to force certain changes in the structure and working of the country in the direction of greater democracy.”​[18]​ The size of this economic reward was comparatively small, however. Firstly, while the PCA incentive was credible – the EU concluded such agreements with all the other successor states of the Soviet Union – potential EU rewards did not go beyond partnership and cooperation. To this day, the EU has not offered the prospect of membership, to any of the CIS countries. Secondly, in contrast with almost all other CEECs, the Lukashenka regime has clearly preferred economic and political integration with the Russian Federation over integration with or membership in the EU. Declarations of the Belarusian government such as the March 2002 statement that “a long-term strategic goal of Belarus is the membership in the European Union”​[19]​ have had little practical meaning. Thus, in sum, external incentives were consistent but low.

Domestic Conditions
Those unfavourable international conditions for political conditionality were combined with very high domestic adaptation costs. After having been elected President in 1994, Lukashenka has done everything to maximize his control over the media and the state apparatus all the way down to the local level, and to curb the autonomy and the competencies of the legislative and judicial bodies. To comply with the democratic norms and demands of the European international community would mean to give up his dictatorship and share power with other state actors. 
	Of course, the monopolization of state power initially was probably not necessary for Lukashenka to remain in power but a consequence of his unwillingness to share it. Lukashenka was not only highly popular with the electorate, but the opposition has not been able to produce any leader who could match his popularity ratings. Until the presidential elections of 2001, public support for Lukashenka generally oscillated around 40 to 50 percent of the electorate (compared to around 5 percent for his competitors; cf. Korosteleva 2002: 62). Under these circumstances, many observers concluded that the Lukashenka regime was not only built on repression but could count on the consent and loyalty of large parts of the population (Eke and Kuzio 2000; Timmermann 1997: 36). Although the weakness of his competitors has endured,  Lukashenka’s confidence ratings, however, have more recently fallen and remained below 40 percent. A majority of Belarusians oppose extending his term in office so that he can not be sure to win again in a free and fair election (such as in 1994).​[20]​ In sum, the domestic power costs of adaptation can thus be rated as very high. Compliance would have ended the dictatorial control of Lukashenka and would have increasingly worsened his re-election prospects.

Process and Outcome
Indeed, none of the measures taken by European organizations has induced the Lukashenka regime to comply with the liberal-democratic norms of the European international community and produced any tangible improvement in the political situation of Belarus. The Lukashenka regime has engaged in tactical concessions at best but carefully avoided any constraints on its use of domestic power. 
	For instance, at the same time as the regime agreed upon negotiations with the OSCE on a mission in Belarus and upon an EU-mediated dialogue with the opposition in 1997, it imposed a huge fine against the Minsk office of George Soros’s Open Society Institute and arrested opposition leader Borshchevsky.​[21]​ Within a few weeks, the regime representatives broke off both talks.​[22]​ When the AMG was finally set up in February 1998, it was attacked by Lukashenka from the first moment: Lukashenka called it “absurd”, and asserted that “we do not need such groups.”​[23]​ In the summer of 1999, Lukashenka agreed upon a new OSCE initiative for talks between the regime and the opposition to prepare “free parliamentary elections” in 2000 and, in order to avoid a negative resolution of the UN sub-commission on human rights, the Belarusian regime pledged to invite a UN special rapporteur, to take the necessary measures to join the CE, and to hold free and fair parliamentary elections.​[24]​ Again, however, when the talks began in September 1999, the human rights situation in the country deteriorated rather than improved: members of the opposition and independent newspapers were harassed continuously, Viktar Hanchar, the deputy chairman of the dissolved Supreme Soviet, “disappeared”, participants of a “Freedom March” were beaten and detained.​[25]​ It is typical of Lukashenka’s cynical approach to liberal norms and the talks with the opposition that he personally rejected a protocol that granted the opposition limited access to the state-controlled media – and was signed by the opposition and governmental representatives during the OSCE-mediated talks – as a violation of “all civilized and democratic norms” because it allowed the opposition “to introduce its censorship in the state media.”​[26]​ In January 2000, the electoral code was passed without consultation of the OSCE or the opposition and, in March, the Belarusian authorities initiated their own “dialogue” with loyal associations and parties. 
	After the parliamentary elections of October 2000, Lukashenka and other regime representatives suggested to remove the AMG altogether, accusing it of acting as “a center of categorical support to the opposition parties” and “an instrument of subversive anti-constitutional activity against the Belarusian state”​[27]​, and of recruiting spies and disguising militants as monitors of the election.​[28]​ On the eve of the presidential elections of 2001, the Belarusian government became increasingly nervous and felt defiant because of the attempts by the AMG and other European organizations to organize a dense network of election observers. In May and June 2001, it accused Hans-Georg Wieck, the head of the AMG, of being a German intelligence officer and threatened to expel him from the country.​[29]​ Later, it withheld visas from an OSCE election observer group for a few weeks.​[30]​ After they were permitted to enter the country, they could do little but declare that the election on 9 September, in which Lukashenka claimed to have gained 75 percent of the vote, “maybe ... was somewhat free, ... clearly it was not fair.”​[31]​ As a result, the organizations of the European international community continued their established policies towards Belarus.
	Finally, Lukashenka flatly refused TACIS assistance for the development of civil society – denouncing it as EU funding for opposition parties and media as well as “college students who are against Lukashenka.”​[32]​ It took almost two years until Belarus endorsed an amended version of the program (in November 1999).​[33]​ In March 2001 again, Lukashenka issued a decree banning the use of foreign assistance to the opposition.​[34]​
From December 2001 onwards, the Belarusian government stopped extending visas for the AMG diplomats and, time and again, threatened to expel the entire mission. It refused to accredit the new head of mission Eberhard Heyken unless the AMG mandate was renegotiated, and subsequentely expelled two acting heads in April and June 2002.​[35]​ After the accreditation of the last staff member expired in October 2002, the AMG effectively ceased to operate. 
In response, on 19 November 2002, 14 out of 15 EU member states decided to ban the political leadership of Belarus from entering their countries.​[36]​ The U.S. administration followed a few days later. At the beginning of December 2002, Lukashenka declared his readiness to accept a new OSCE mission in Belarus.​[37]​ On 30 December 2002, subsequent negotiations within the OSCE then led to an agreement on closing  the AMG and open a new OSCE Office in Minsk with the mandate “of promoting institution-building, consolidating the rule of law, developing relations with civil society, in accordance with OSCE principles and commitments, and developing economic and environmental activities.”​[38]​ In April 2003, both the U.S. and the 14 EU member states lifted their ban. However, as Uta Zapf, head of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s ad hoc Working Group on Belarus, noted, “the future OSCE mission will have to discuss most of its steps with the authorities, which will allow them
inordinate control and allow interference in its activities.” In addition, the new mission’s mandate “lacked a whole range of human-rights issues.”​[39]​ For instance, democracy, freedom of the press, and human rights were not mentioned in the mandate. On 20 February 2003, in another accommodating move towards Belarus and reversal of previous policy, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, in a narrow decision voted to recognize the delegation of the Belarusian parliament created by Lukashenka’s constitution as a full member despite the negative report of an OSCE delegation.​[40]​
	The quality of cooperation between the OSCE and the Belarusian authorities did not improve either. An observation mission for the local elections in March 2003 could not work effectively, because Belarus postponed its invitation until the last minute. Although in May 2003, Uta Zapf was still “encouraged by the openness and readiness” of Belarusian officials to consider modifications in the country’s electoral code, neither the Electoral Commission nor the Constitutional Court nor the legislature agreed on any changes.​[41]​ In January 2004, the Parliamentary Troika was banned from entering the country. Most importantly, the Belarusian government failed to fulfil or compromise on any of the substantive demands of the European international community and its repression of independent media and civil society organizations reached new heights.​[42]​
	As a consequence, and in contrast to the more accommodating tactics of 2002 and 2003, the European organizations have recently become more critical and impatient with Belarus. Following a report on the disappearances in Belarus, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe called for “maximum political pressure” on the Lukashenka regime in April 2004.​[43]​ The EU excluded Belarus from its “New Neighborhood” strategy.​[44]​ And the OSCE’s Uta Zapf criticized the deteriorating state of democracy and human rights in the country.​[45]​

Results
Throughout the period of observation (1996-2004), the Lukashenka regime has not complied with the substantive demands of the European international community and its conditions for ending the isolation of the last remaining pariah state in Europe. The regime has only made temporary tactical concessions on secondary issues such as the OSCE mission in the country, but the mission has never had a tangible impact on the political behavior of the regime as such. Although EU policy (and Western policy in general) has been consistent and norm-conforming, it has been ineffective as a result of weak external incentives and high domestic power costs.
	There is some disagreement and debate among activists, observers, and western governments as to the appropriate degree of isolation of the Belarusian regime and of support to the opposition. Has OSCE engagement contributed to the strengthening of civil society in Belarus, as claimed by Hans-Georg Wieck (2002: 274), or has western support nurtured a fragmented and sectarian opposition, detached from Belarusian society and more focused on receiving western moneys than on political work in the country (see, e.g., Korosteleva 2002: 60, Silitski 2002: 367)? Have the efforts to isolate the Lukashenka regime not gone far enough or have they proven ineffective and need to be replaced by a more proactive engagement of the regime, in particular as Belarus has become a direct neighbor of the EU and NATO?​[46]​ The analysis suggests that these options do not matter for compliance. Regardless of the level of support to the opposition and the level of isolation of the regime, the extremely unfavorable conditions in Belarus are likely to frustrate any western policy aimed at domestic change in this country.

Conclusions
What are the prospects for democracy and human rights promotion in the context of the EU’s European Neighborhood Policy? In this paper, I have argued that, whereas the promotion of democracy and human rights through political conditionality as envisioned in the ENP program documents has had a long tradition in EU external governance, the prospects for its success in ENP are bad. First, in the absence of a membership perspective for the ENP countries, political conditionality lacks the major external incentives that could motivate target states to change domestic institutions and policies. What is more, outside of the accession context, political conditionality is likely to be compromised by other goals of EU external governance. Finally, given that  the EU mainly deals with authoritarian and autocratic regimes in ENP, the domestic power costs that they would incur by complying with EU standards, are likely to outweigh any incentives the EU might have to offer them.
References

Charman, Kenneth (2002): Belarus: The Foreign Aid Dilemma, in: Lewis, Ann (ed.): The EU and Belarus: Between Moscow and Brussels, London: Federal Trust, 387-406.

Commission of the European Communities (2004): Communication from the Commission. European Neighborhood Policy. Strategy Paper, COM(2004) 373 final, Brussels, 12 May 2004.

Diamond, Larry. 1996. Is the Third Wave Over? Journal of Democracy 7:3, 20-37.
Eke, Steven M. and Kuzio, Taras (2000). Sultanism in Eastern Europe: The Socio-Political Roots of Authoritarian Populism in. Europe-Asia Studies 52(3):523-547.

Jasiewicz, Krzysztof. 1998. Elections and Voting Behaviour. In Developments in Central and East European Politics, Vol. 2, edited by Stephen White, Judy Batt, and Paul Lewis, 166-87. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Kelley, Judith (2004) International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions, International Organization 58:3, 425-457.

Kelley, Judith (2005) New Wine in Old Wineskins: Policy Learning and Adaptation in the New European Neighborhood Policy. Working Paper, Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy, Duke University, Durham, N.C. 

Korosteleva, Elena (2002): Political Leadership and Public Support in Belarus: Forward to the Past?, in: Lewis, Ann (ed.): The EU and Belarus: Between Moscow and Brussels, London: Federal Trust, 51-69.

Krause, Kevin Deegan (2003) The Ambivalent Influence of the European Union on Democratization in Slovakia, in: Kubicek, Paul J. (ed.) (2003): The European Union and Democratization, London: Routledge, 56-86.

Kubicek, Paul J. (ed.) (2003): The European Union and Democratization, London: Routledge.

Marples, David R. (2002) : Belarus : The Last European Dictatorship ?, in: Lewis, Ann (ed.): The EU and Belarus: Between Moscow and Brussels, London: Federal Trust, 31-44.

Pravda, Alex. 2001. Introduction. In Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, Vol. 2 International and Transnational Factors, edited by Jan Zielonka and Alex Pravda, 1-27. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sahm, Astrid (2001). Integration, Kooperation oder Isolation? Die Ukraine und Belarus' im Vorfeld der EU-Osterweiterung. Osteuropa 51(11/12):1391-1404.

Schimmelfennig, Frank (2003) Strategic Action in a Community Environment. The Decision to Enlarge the European Union to the East, in: Comparative Political Studies 36: 1/2, 2003 (special issue “Integrating Institutions”, edited by James Caporaso, Jeffrey T. Checkel, and Joseph Jupille), 156-183.

Schimmelfennig, Frank (2005a): The International Promotion of Political Norms in Eastern Europe: a Qualitative Comparative Analysis, CES Working Paper, Harvard University: Center for European Studies.

Schimmelfennig, Frank (2005b): Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe, in: International Organization 59: 4, 2005.

Schimmelfennig, Frank; Engert, Stefan; and Knobel, Heiko (2003): Cost, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey, Journal of Common Market Studies 41: 3, 495-518.

Schimmelfennig, Frank; Engert, Stefan, and Knobel, Heiko (2005): The Impact of EU Political Conditionality, in: Schimmelfennig, Frank and Sedelmeier Ulrich (eds.): The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Schimmelfennig, Frank and Sedelmeier, Ulrich (2005): Introduction: Conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, in: Schimmelfennig, Frank and Sedelmeier Ulrich (eds.): The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Silitski, Vitali (2002): The Change is Yet to Come: Opposition Strategies and Western Efforts to Promote Democracy in Belarus, in: Lewis, Ann (ed.): The EU and Belarus: Between Moscow and Brussels, London: Federal Trust, 351-373.

Timmermann, Heinz (1997) Belarus: Eine Diktatur im Herzen Europas? Köln: BIOst.

Vachudova, Milada Anna. (2001) The Leverage of International Institutions on Democratizing States: Eastern Europe and the European Union (EUI Working Papers RSC No. 2001/33). San Domenico: European University Institute.

Vachudova, Milada (2005) Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration Since 1989, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wieck, Hans-Georg (2000) The Role of International Institutions in the Belarusian Parliamentary Elections. International Credibility of President Lukashenko at Stake, available at http://www.osce.org/belarus/documents/speeches/files/17september2000.pdf (​http:​/​​/​www.osce.org​/​belarus​/​documents​/​speeches​/​files​/​17september2000.pdf​).

Wieck, Hans-Georg (2002) The OSCE and the Council of Europe in Conflict with the Lukashenko Regime, in: Lewis, Ann (ed.): The EU and Belarus: Between Moscow and Brussels, London: Federal Trust, 261-275.















^1	  	See Barcelona Declaration at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/bd.htm>, last accessed 3 December 2004.
^2	  	See http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/news/memo04_275.htm, last accessed 15 February 2005.
^3	  	See Kelley 2004; Kubicek 2003; Schimmelfennig 2005a; 2005b; Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel 2003; 2005; Vachudova 2005.
^4	  	The Freedom Index combines the ratings for “civil liberties” and “political rights” and ranges from 1 (best) to 7 (worst). See <http://www.freedomhouse.org>. Kelley (2005) uses other data and comparisons but comes to similar conclusions.
^5	 	Agence Europe (AE), 8 June 1995.
^6	 	AE, 29 February 1996; 12 June 1996; 26 September 1996.
^7	  	After the 2000 parliamentary elections, the OSCE PA left the seats for the Belarusian delegation empty.  
^8	 	AE, 24 December 1997.
^9	 	RFE/RL Newsline, 21 July 1999; SZ, 23 July 1999.
^10	 	AE, 1 May 1997. Cf. AE, 17 September 1997.
^11	  	See, e.g., RFE/RL Newsline, 5 February 2002; 11 March 2002 
^12	 	See http://www.osce.org/belarus/overview.htm; Wieck 2002: 268.
^13	 	AE, 24 December 1997.
^14	  	Jan Maksymiuk, „Should Lukashenka be Regarded a Legitimate President?“, RFE/RL Newsline, 11 September 2001; RFE/RL Newsline, 21 July 2003.
^15	 	EU General Affairs Council, Conclusions, in: AE, 17 September 1997.
^16	 	Declaration on Belarus by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, 16 January 1997,  <http://press.coe.int/cp/97/18a(97).htm> (9 April 2001).
^17	 	AE, 30 April 1997; cf. AE, 1 May 1997.
^18	 	AE, 17 April 1997.
^19	  	See, e.g., “Special Update of Belarusian News: Relations between Belarus and the European Union”,<www.belarusembassy.org/us/news/210302.htm>. 
^20	  	Vital Silitski, „Lukashenka’s popularity rises as no viable alternative to be found“, RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report, 5:2, 21 January 2003; “The fall of the patriarch”, ibid., 5:19, 20 May 2003.; “Is Lukashenka winning back hearts and minds?”, ibid., 5: 39, 21 October 2003; RFE/RL Newsline, 2 February 2004.
^21	 	RFE/RL Newsline, 20 June 1997; SZ 21 June 1997.
^22	 	RFE/RL Newsline, 18 July 1997; SZ 4 August 1997.
^23	 	RFE/RL Newsline, 6 March 1998.
^24	 	RFE/RL Newsline, 15 July 1999; RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report 1:14, 31 August 1999.
^25	 	Jan Maksymiuk, “Lukashenka Prefers Monologue”, RFE/RL Newsline, 29 September 1999.
^26	 	RFE/RL Newsline, 16 November 1999.
^27	 	RFE/RL Newsline, 29 November 2000; 12 December 2000.
^28	  	FAZ, 5 February 2001; RFE/RL Newsline, 29 January 2001.
^29	  	RFE/RL Newsline, 18 May 2001; 11 June 2001.
^30	  	RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report 3:30, 14 August 2001.
^31	  	OSCE mission coordinator Kimmo Kiljunen, quoted in RFE/RL Newsline, 10 September 2001.
^32	 	AE, 22/23 June 1998; RFE/RL Newsline, 18 March 1998.
^33	 	“The EU’s relations with Belarus – an overview”, available at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/ external_relations/belarus/intro/index.html” (last visited 11 April 2001).
^34	  	RFE/RL Newsline, 15 March 2001.
^35	  	RFE/RL Newsline, 7 February 2002; 29 March 2002; 16 April 2002; 3 June 2002.
^36	  	Portugal did not join the EU initiative because it held the OSCE presidency at the time and wanted to keep its options open. See RFE/RL Newsline, 20 November 2002.
^37	  	RFE/RL Newsline, 5 December 2002.
^38	  	www.osce.org/belarus/overview (15 March 2004).
^39	  	RFE/RL Newsline, 7 January 2003.
^40	  	RFE/RL Newsline, 21 February 2003.
^41	   	RFE/RL Newsline, 29 May 2003; 16 September 2003; 22 September 2003; 1 October 2003.
^42	  	RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report 5:41, 4 November 2003.
^43	  	RFE/RL Belarus and Ukraine Report 6:16, 4 May 2004.
^44	  	RFE/RL Newsline, 13 May 2004.
^45	  	RFE/RL Newsline, 24 June 2004.
^46	  	On the disagreement among EU member state governments, see RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report 5:39, 21 October 2003.
